



EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LAMPUNG CIVIL SERVICE POLICE UNIT'S AUTHORITY: AN EDWARDS III AND SWOT-TOWS ANALYSIS

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Abstract :

This study analyzes the effectiveness of the implementation of authority by the Lampung Province Civil Service Police Unit (Satpol PP) in enforcing public order and community tranquility (Trantibum), using Edwards III's four-variable framework (communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure), enriched by Ansell and Gash's collaborative governance perspective. Employing a qualitative case study approach, data were collected through in-depth interviews with twelve informants across organizational levels, participant observation of three field operations, and a document review of the 2024 Minimum Service Standards (SPM) Evaluation Report for Trantibum. The findings show that the authority of the provincial Satpol PP is coordinative rather than command-based, and its effectiveness is constrained by statutory ambiguity surrounding the concept of 'facilitation' and by systemic resource deficits. Relational analysis reveals that the four Edwards III variables do not operate independently; rather, they form a pattern of institutional mismatch: resource constraints weaken the effectiveness of policy communication, while dysfunction in the bureaucratic structure contributes to variations in implementers' dispositions in the field. A SWOT-TOWS analysis, validated through member checking, produced eight strengthening strategies fully accepted by key informants, with the formalization of coordination mechanisms and the clarification of facilitation criteria identified as short-term priorities. This study extends the Edwards III framework to coordinative intergovernmental relations and proposes the concept of adaptive facilitation as an institutional response to regulatory ambiguity.

Keywords : policy implementation; authority; Satpol PP; Edwards III; collaborative governance; SWOT-TOWS

INTRODUCTION

Public order and community tranquility (Trantibum) constitute a concurrent governmental affair jointly administered by provincial and regency/city governments, as stipulated in Law No. 23 of 2014 on Regional Government. This function is carried out by the Civil Service Police Unit (Satpol PP). Government Regulation No. 16 of 2018 affirms that the authority of provincial Satpol PP is coordinative, exercised through guidance and supervision of regency/city Satpol PP, rather than through a direct command relationship. This cross-level and cross-jurisdictional authority structure creates implementation challenges that differ from the hierarchical command settings commonly assumed in policy implementation theory.


In Lampung Province, the urgency of this study is reinforced by empirical data from the 2024 Evaluation Report on the Trantibum Sub-Affair - Minimum



Service Standards (SPM). Of the 787 personnel supporting the implementation of the Trantibum SPM, only 16 (2.03%) were Civil Servant Investigators (PPNS), who serve as the front line in enforcing regional regulations across regencies and cities. The budget for enforcing Regional Regulations and Governor Regulations in the same year was only IDR 131,062,000, an amount disproportionate to the mandate to coordinate 15 regencies/cities across an area of 35,376 km². Disparities in Trantibum SPM performance were also striking: Pesisir Barat Regency achieved only 67.33%, whereas several other regencies reached 100%.

Figure 1 and Table 1 summarize the magnitude of the resource-capacity gap. PPNS personnel account for only 2.03% of the total workforce. Based on the reported area, budget, and jurisdictional coverage, the descriptive workload is approximately 2,211 km² per PPNS, while the enforcement budget averages approximately IDR 8.74 million per regency/city. These derived indicators are not causal measures, but they provide quantitative context for the institutional mismatch examined qualitatively in this study.

Figure 1. Composition of Personnel Supporting the Trantibum SPM, 2024



Source: 2024 Trantibum SPM Evaluation Report, processed by the authors.

Table 1. Quantitative Resource-Capacity Context of Lampung Province Satpol PP

Indicator	Reported value	Derived indicator	Analytical relevance
Personnel supporting Trantibum SPM	787 personnel	16 PPNS; 771 other personnel	PPNS represent only 2.03% of the workforce.
Provincial coordination coverage	15 regencies/cities	≈ 1 PPNS for each jurisdiction	Limited specialized enforcement capacity must serve all jurisdictions.
Provincial territorial area	35,376 km ²	≈ 2,211 km ² per PPNS	Illustrates the geographic burden attached to the coordinative mandate.
Enforcement budget	IDR 131,062,000	≈ IDR 8.74 million per regency/city	Indicates restricted fiscal space for operations and formal coordination.
Budget intensity	IDR 131,062,000 / 35,376 km ²	≈ IDR 3,705 per km ²	Provides a descriptive measure of budget-to-territory imbalance.
Illustrative SPM performance gap	67.33% versus 100%	32.67 percentage points	Shows substantial disparity across regencies/cities in the reported examples.

Source: 2024 Trantibum SPM Evaluation Report; derived indicators calculated by the authors from figures reported in the study.

The imbalance between the breadth of the institutional mandate and limited resource capacity is consistent with what institutional economics terms institutional mismatch (North, 1990). However, policy implementation research on Satpol PP in Indonesia remains dominated by single-variable descriptive studies or studies at the regency/city level (Dewi, Roza, & Mulyawan, 2026;

Kadir, 2023; Torokano, Lamakampali, & Borahima, 2026), while research on coordinative province-regency/city relations, which are structurally different from hierarchical command relations, remains relatively limited. Moreover, most policy implementation studies using the Edwards III framework tend to treat its four variables (communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure) as parallel and descriptive, without explaining the causal relationships among them.

Based on these gaps, this study aims to: (1) analyze the implementation of the authority of Lampung Province Satpol PP in enforcing Trantibum; (2) examine cross-level coordination mechanisms and their supporting and inhibiting factors; (3) analyze the determinants of implementation effectiveness through the Edwards III framework, including the relationships among its variables; and (4) formulate strategies to strengthen implementation through SWOT analysis and an empirically validated TOWS Matrix. This study is expected to contribute theoretically by extending the application of Edwards III and collaborative governance, and practically by strengthening Trantibum governance at the provincial level.

Literature Review

Edwards III Policy Implementation Model

Edwards (1980) proposed four mutually influential variables that determine the success of public policy implementation: communication (the transmission, clarity, and consistency of policy messages), resources (staff, information, authority, and facilities), disposition (implementers' attitudes and commitment), and bureaucratic structure (standard operating procedures and organizational fragmentation). This framework has been widely applied in policy implementation studies in Indonesia, including studies of law enforcement institutions (Torokano, Lamakampali, & Borahima, 2026). However, its operationalization generally treats the four variables as independent descriptive categories rather than as an interrelated causal sequence.

Collaborative Governance and Governmental Authority

Ansell and Gash (2008) define collaborative governance as a consensus-oriented decision-making process involving public and non-public actors, with trust building as a key prerequisite for success. This framework is generally applied to cross-sectoral or multi-actor relations, but recent studies demonstrate its relevance to intra-governmental relations characterized by mandated collaboration (Afandi, Anomsari, Novira, & Sudartini, 2023) and to the formulation of SWOT-based collaborative strategies at the local government level (Nawawi et al., 2025). Meanwhile, governmental authority in Indonesian administrative law refers to the concepts of attribution, delegation, and mandate articulated by Hadjon (1997): authority derived from attribution and delegation has a clear legal basis, but its implementation (*uitvoering*) in practice still requires standardized operational criteria to prevent statutory ambiguity.

SWOT-TOWS Analysis as a Strategy Formulation Instrument

Wehrich (1982) developed the TOWS Matrix as a systematic instrument for combining internal factors (strengths and weaknesses) with external factors

(opportunities and threats) to formulate SO, WO, ST, and WT strategy alternatives. This approach has been widely adapted in Indonesian public-sector organizations, including for formulating conflict management and local institutional strengthening strategies (Adiwilaga, Mustofa, & Permana, 2023; Rangkuti, 2015), as well as for developing IFAS-EFAS-based collaborative governance strategies in regional development planning forums (Nawawi et al., 2025). However, most applications of SWOT in government studies stop at strategy formulation without validating their traceability to empirical findings or the underlying theoretical framework - a gap this study addresses through member checking and explicit tracing of the links among strategies, findings, and theory.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study employed a qualitative approach with a case study design at the Lampung Province Satpol PP. Primary data were collected through in-depth interviews with twelve informants grouped into five categories: top leadership (K1), echelon III officials responsible for regulatory design and coordination (K2), Civil Servant Investigators (PPNS) (K3), field personnel (K4), and personnel/human resources administrators (K5). The data were enriched through participant observation of three field operations - guidance for street vendors on Ryacudu Street, asset control in Sabah Balau, and asset control in Kota Baru - as well as document analysis of the 2024 Trantibum SPM Evaluation Report and related regulations (Regional Regulation No. 3 of 2021 and Governor Regulation No. 43 of 2023).

Data were analyzed thematically using the Edwards III framework to identify the determinants of implementation effectiveness, followed by a SWOT-TOWS analysis to formulate strengthening strategies. SWOT factors were identified through triangulation of three data sources (interviews, observation, and documentation) using traceable source codes, and were subsequently validated through member checking with four key informants using a Findings Confirmation Form. Data credibility was maintained through source and method triangulation, as well as an audit trail covering all transcripts and field notes.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Implementation of Authority: Coordinative, Not Command-Based

The findings confirm that the authority of the Lampung Province Satpol PP over regency/city Satpol PP is coordinative, exercised through guidance and supervision, consistent with Government Regulation No. 16 of 2018. In practice, this mechanism takes the form of forwarding complaints, requesting investigation reports, and applying an urgency-based prioritization system. A fundamental problem arises from the concept of 'facilitation' as stipulated in Article 5 of Governor Regulation No. 43 of 2023: at the time of the study, no standardized criteria existed for determining when the condition 'may facilitate' was considered fulfilled. Divergent views emerged between top leadership, which acknowledged the absence of operational criteria, and regulation

designers, who considered the existing regulation adequate and viewed the main problem as the capacity of human resources to interpret it. This difference demonstrates that the implementation problem is not merely the presence or absence of a norm, but its operational clarity for implementers at different levels - a finding consistent with Edwards's (1980) emphasis on clarity in policy communication.

Coordination Mechanisms: Reliance on Informal Trust Building

Formal coordination forums between the provincial and regency/city Satpol PP, ideally held once a month, have in practice become increasingly infrequent because of budget constraints and have been replaced by virtual coordination through WhatsApp groups and the Lampung IN application. The data show a sharp decline in PPNS coordination meetings until they ceased entirely. As a substitute, the quality of coordination relies heavily on coordination etiquette and personal relationships - the principle of 'greeting first before entering someone else's jurisdiction' has become an unwritten norm observed in every cross-jurisdictional operation. This finding empirically confirms Ansell and Gash's (2008) central proposition that trust building is a critical prerequisite for effective collaboration, while extending it to intra-governmental relations across levels within the same institutional family - a context still underexplored in collaborative governance literature, which generally focuses on cross-sectoral relations (Afandi et al., 2023; Nawawi et al., 2025).

Edwards III Determinants: Patterns of Relationships among Variables

Cross-category analysis of informants confirms the relevance of the four Edwards III variables as determinants of implementation effectiveness. For communication, the main issue is not the absence of norms but the clarity and consistency with which they are conveyed to all levels of implementers. For resources, the shortage of PPNS personnel (16 of 787 personnel) and an enforcement budget disproportionate to the mandate to coordinate 15 regencies/cities were the constraints most consistently identified by all informant categories. For disposition, field personnel displayed varying patterns of discretion - ranging from complete reliance on superiors' orders to situational decision-making to ensure personnel safety. For bureaucratic structure, the PPNS Coordinator function and the PPNS coordination forum were dysfunctional because of the lack of a supporting budget and had been replaced by informal mechanisms based on personal relationships.

More importantly, relational analysis shows that the four variables do not operate independently but form an explicit causal sequence. Resource constraints (the absence of a training budget for the past three years) directly prevented policy communication concerning facilitation criteria and regulatory changes from reaching all personnel evenly. A weakened bureaucratic structure, resulting from the discontinuation of formal coordination forums, also contributed to diverse field dispositions: when institutional reference points for decision-making in urgent situations were no longer available, personnel developed their own response patterns based on personal experience. This causal combination -

limited resources weakening communication, and dysfunctional bureaucratic structures shaping differences in disposition - produces a condition theoretically described as institutional mismatch (North, 1990): a fundamental misalignment between the breadth of the institutional mandate and the resource capacity available to carry it out. This finding modifies the implicit assumption in Edwards III operationalizations that generally treat the four variables as parallel and independent (compare the descriptive approach in Torokano, Lamakampali, & Borahima, 2026), by showing that they are causally interdependent.

The relational pattern is summarized in Table 2. The matrix clarifies that the implementation problem is generated not by one isolated variable, but by a sequence in which resource and structural constraints alter communication and field-level disposition.

Table 2. Relational Matrix of Institutional Mismatch among Edwards III Variables

Causal relationship	Empirical evidence	Implementation effect	Theoretical interpretation
Resources → Communication	No training budget was available for the past three years.	Facilitation criteria and regulatory changes were not disseminated evenly to personnel.	Resource scarcity reduces the transmission, clarity, and consistency of policy messages.
Resources → Bureaucratic structure	Formal coordination forums declined and PPNS meetings ceased because of budget constraints.	The PPNS coordinator function and formal coordination mechanism became dysfunctional.	Insufficient resources weaken the organizational arrangements required for implementation.
Bureaucratic structure → Disposition	Institutional reference points for urgent cases were no longer routinely available.	Field personnel developed different discretion patterns based on orders, safety, and personal experience.	Structural fragmentation produces variation in implementer attitudes and decisions.
Communication → Disposition	The phrase 'may facilitate' lacked measurable operational criteria and was interpreted differently across levels.	Implementers differed in deciding when provincial facilitation should occur.	Statutory ambiguity shapes commitment, confidence, and discretionary behavior.
Combined effect	A broad coordinative mandate operates with limited PPNS personnel, budget, training, and formal forums.	Implementation depends on informal trust, digital channels, and urgency-based responses.	Institutional mismatch generates adaptive facilitation as a survival response.

Source: Triangulated interviews, participant observation, and document analysis; processed by the authors.


Strengthening Strategies: A SWOT-TOWS Analysis Based on Empirical Findings

SWOT factors were identified through triangulation of interviews, participant observation, and document analysis of the 2024 Trantibum SPM Evaluation Report, yielding six strengths, seven weaknesses, six opportunities, and six threats, all traceable to specific data sources. Member checking with four key informants corrected two of the researchers' initial formulations: the weakness concerning the absence of legal protection for personnel was revised because the legal framework (Government Regulation No. 16 of 2018) was in fact available but had not been adequately disseminated; similarly, the factor concerning the absence of a feedback reporting mechanism was revised because informal channels could already be used, although they had not yet been formalized.

As shown in Figure 2, the triangulation process generated a relatively

balanced SWOT profile, although weaknesses were the most numerous category. This distribution supports a strategy orientation that combines institutional leverage with targeted correction of internal capacity deficits.

Figure 2. Distribution of Empirically Identified SWOT Factors




Source: Research findings; factors identified through interviews, observation, and document analysis.

Combining the factors through the TOWS Matrix (Weihrich, 1982) produced ten strategy formulations, eight of which (SO1-SO3, WO2-WO3, ST1, and WT1-WT2) were fully accepted by all key informants as relevant, feasible, and institutionally acceptable. Two other strategies required caution: redistributing PPNS personnel based on SPM disparity data was considered relevant but required further feasibility assessment, while establishing a rapid-response team for regulatory changes was explicitly deemed infeasible by two key informants. All eight fully validated strategies were directly traceable to the empirical findings and the relevant Edwards III variables: the SO strategies addressed bureaucratic structure and communication by formalizing pentahelix collaboration and a cross-regency/city monitoring dashboard; the WO strategies directly addressed statutory ambiguity in communication through the development of standardized facilitation criteria; and the WT strategies addressed urgent needs through dissemination of the legal framework for personnel protection and formalization of feedback channels that had previously operated informally. This strategy-finding-theory linkage is consistent with the IFAS-EFAS-based formulation of collaborative governance strategies (Nawawi et al., 2025), but deepens it by explicitly tracing each strategy to informant quotations and specific theoretical variables.

Figure 3 indicates that 80% of the formulated strategies were fully accepted through member checking. Table 3 then presents the evidence-to-strategy logic of the TOWS formulation, focusing on strategy directions explicitly supported by the findings and recommendations of this study.

Figure 3. Member-Checking Status of TOWS Strategy Formulations



Source: Findings Confirmation Form completed by four key informants; processed by the authors.

Table 3. Evidence-to-Strategy TOWS Matrix

Internal / External	Opportunities	Threats
Strengths	SO direction: • Formalize pentahelix collaboration. • Institutionalize a cross-regency/city monitoring dashboard. • Use digital coordination channels to complement formal forums.	ST direction: • Use the coordinative legal mandate and guidance-supervision role to sustain cross-jurisdictional responses. • Preserve coordination etiquette and trust building when entering another jurisdiction.
Weaknesses	WO direction: • Formulate measurable operational criteria for when Satpol PP 'may facilitate.' • Reactivate periodic formal coordination forums. • Strengthen personnel capacity and implement the mandated PPNS allowance.	WT direction: • Disseminate the existing personnel-protection framework. • Formalize feedback and reporting channels. • Prioritize cases using urgency and SPM disparity data while feasibility is assessed.

Source: SWOT-TOWS findings and member-checking results. The matrix presents selected strategy directions explicitly supported by the article.

Research Contributions to the Development of Public Administration

This study makes three contributions that distinguish it from previous research on Trantibum implementation. First, it develops a coordinative-relational model of cross-level coordination, extending Ansell and Gash's (2008) collaborative governance framework to intra-governmental relations across levels within the same institutional family, rather than only cross-sectoral relations as in the theory's original context. Second, it conceptualizes institutional mismatch as a causal relational pattern among the Edwards III variables rather than merely a list of separate barriers, enriching Edwards's (1980) framework by demonstrating how the four variables influence one another. Third, it introduces adaptive facilitation as an institutional response to statutory ambiguity: instead of becoming paralyzed by the absence of standardized criteria for 'facilitation,' the Lampung Province Satpol PP developed a reactive-adaptive facilitation pattern based on requests and case urgency as a survival strategy in the face of an operational regulatory vacuum. This finding complements the literature on statutory ambiguity by showing that implementers are not always passive when confronting regulatory uncertainty.

CONCLUSION

The implementation of authority by the Lampung Province Satpol PP in enforcing Trantibum has proceeded within its coordinative normative framework; however, its effectiveness is constrained by statutory ambiguity in facilitation criteria and systemic resource deficits. The four Edwards III variables - communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure - are intertwined in a pattern of institutional mismatch rather than functioning as separate barriers. The empirically validated SWOT-TOWS analysis produced eight institutionally feasible and accepted strengthening strategies, with the formalization of facilitation criteria and the reinforcement of formal coordination mechanisms identified as priorities.

In practical terms, the Lampung Provincial Government should promptly formulate measurable operational criteria for conditions under which Satpol PP 'may facilitate,' implement the special PPNS allowance mandated by regulation, and reactivate periodic formal coordination forums. Academically, future policy implementation research should consider path analysis among the Edwards III variables to quantitatively test the causal patterns identified qualitatively in this study and extend the testing of adaptive facilitation to other coordinative intergovernmental relations in Indonesia.

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